Surprisingly rational: probability theory plus noise explains biases in judgment.

F Costello, P Watts - Psychological review, 2014 - psycnet.apa.org
The systematic biases seen in people's probability judgments are typically taken as
evidence that people do not use the rules of probability theory when reasoning about …

People's conditional probability judgments follow probability theory (plus noise)

F Costello, P Watts - Cognitive psychology, 2016 - Elsevier
A common view in current psychology is that people estimate probabilities using various
'heuristics' or rules of thumb that do not follow the normative rules of probability theory. We …

[图书][B] Cognition and chance: The psychology of probabilistic reasoning

RS Nickerson - 2004 - taylorfrancis.com
Lack of ability to think probabilistically makes one prone to a variety of irrational fears and
vulnerable to scams designed to exploit probabilistic naiveté, impairs decision making under …

[PDF][PDF] The calibration of expert judgment: Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory

DJ Koehler, L Brenner, D Griffin - Heuristics and biases …, 2002 - bear.warrington.ufl.edu
The study of how people use subjective probabilities is a remarkably modern concern, and
was largely motivated by the increasing use of expert judgment during and after World War II …

How to make cognitive illusions disappear: Beyond “heuristics and biases”

G Gigerenzer - European review of social psychology, 1991 - Taylor & Francis
Most so-called “errors” in probabilistic reasoning are in fact not violations of probability
theory. Examples of such “errors” include overconfidence bias, conjunction fallacy, and base …

[图书][B] Theories of probability: an examination of logical and qualitative foundations

L Narens - 2007 - books.google.com
Standard probability theory has been an enormously successful contribution to modern
science. However, from many perspectives it is too narrow as a general theory of …

Chances and frequencies in probabilistic reasoning: rejoinder to Hoffrage, Gigerenzer, Krauss, and Martignon

V Girotto, M Gonzalez - Cognition, 2002 - Elsevier
Do individuals unfamiliar with probability and statistics need a specific type of data in order
to draw correct inferences about uncertain events? Girotto and Gonzalez (Cognition 78 …

Paranormal belief and reasoning

N Dagnall, A Parker, G Munley - Personality and Individual Differences, 2007 - Elsevier
This paper examined whether belief in the paranormal is linked to a general weakness in
probabilistic reasoning, or whether belief in the paranormal is directly linked to the …

Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty

L Cosmides, J Tooby - cognition, 1996 - Elsevier
Professional probabilists have long argued over what probability means, with, for example,
Bayesians arguing that probabilities refer to subjective degrees of confidence and …

The Bayesian sampler: Generic Bayesian inference causes incoherence in human probability judgments.

JQ Zhu, AN Sanborn, N Chater - Psychological review, 2020 - psycnet.apa.org
Human probability judgments are systematically biased, in apparent tension with Bayesian
models of cognition. But perhaps the brain does not represent probabilities explicitly, but …