There is a debate in philosophy and cognitive science over whether concepts–the building
blocks of thought—are couched in a perceptual modality or are amodally represented. The …

The debate about the nature of the representational format of concepts seems to have
reached an impasse. The debate faces two fundamental problems. Firstly, amodalists (ie …

In this paper, I review the main criteria offered for distinguishing the modal and amodal
approaches to conceptual format: the type of input to which the representations respond, the …

We provide a historical and philosophical review of the main theories of concepts that
implicitly or explicitly ground the various senses of the concept “concept” in psychology and …

The primary aim of the article is to take a fresh look at the debate between amodal and
grounded (modality-specific) theories of conceptual representations by formulating what I …

This is exciting stuff. Philosophers have long explored the structure of human concepts from
the inside, by manipulating their skills as users of those concepts. And since Quine most …

provide a challenging review of the literature on concepts, urging researchers to consider
concepts across multiple different functions and so gain a clearer view of their key …

Traditionally, theories of concepts in psychology assume that concepts are a single, uniform
kind of mental representation. But no single kind of representation can explain all of the …

As it would be impossible to account for even only half of these issues in such a short
chapter as this, we provide neither a survey nor a comprehensive theory of concepts. No …

In this chapter we review recent work on human concepts and concept forma tion. Our fIrst
task is to specify what we mean by concept. The term is a loaded one, as it serves several …