Economists have long promoted fishery rationalization programs, but ITQs may fail to address the ecological consequences of fishing. Of particular concern is that economic …
This paper considers four alternative policies for controlling harvest within a fishery:(1) individual limits without a permit market,(2) individual limits with a permit market,(3) a …
R Singh, Q Weninger - Journal of Environmental Economics and …, 2009 - Elsevier
We consider the problem of multi-species fisheries management when targeting individual species is costly and at-sea discards of fish by fishermen are unobserved by the regulator …
Economists have long promoted fishery rationalization programs, but ITQs may fail to address the ecological consequences of fishing. Of particular concern is that economic …
This empirical study examines welfare gains and losses that would result from alternative fishery management regimes. In an application to the North Sea demersal fisheries, the …
This paper derives rational ecological–economic equilibrium outcomes—capital and variable input allocations, harvests, discards, revenue, costs, and stock abundances—in a …
Whereas rights-based catch regulations such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are gaining traction as the key management instrument in many fisheries, most fisheries are …
MA Turner - Journal of Environmental Economics and management, 1997 - Elsevier
Individual quota (IQ) programs are a promising and increasingly common means of regulating fisheries. This paper examines how profit maximizing fishers respond to different …
R Zhou, K Segerson - Marine Resource Economics, 2016 - journals.uchicago.edu
This article presents an economic model of the efficiency and industry impacts of individual vs. collective approaches to rights-based management in fisheries. Key features of the …