▪ Abstract Policy makers in democracies have strong partisan and electoral incentives
regarding the amount, nature, and timing of economic-policy activity. Given these incentives …

This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy—Russia—
finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides an explanation for why previous literature often …

Perhaps the most striking feature of the postcommunist transformation is the tremendous
variation in rates of economic growth across countries. To account for these differences, this …

The essay explores why some socio-economic reforms are successful and others are not
and why and how the political regime and its institutions affect policy outcomes and the …

Studies of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
have generally failed to detect real economic expansions in preelection periods, casting …

The study primarily investigates if the behavior and effectiveness of CBI on fiscal policy
varies between non-election and election years. It also examines whether the effectiveness …

Книга посвящена анализу политико-экономического управления (governance) в
современной России. В ее фокусе—интересы и идеи правящих групп современной …

We analyze the determinants of corruption in Russia using law enforcement data on
corruption incidents for a panel of 79 Russian regions for the period 2004–13. We find that …

This paper reconciles the long-standing debate on electorally motivated government
spending by embedding politicians' electoral incentives in political institutions. Using …

Empirical studies of electoral competition and public policy in new democracies have been
relatively underdeveloped. This article investigates the election-policy outcome link in a …