By analysing the evolution of local governments' roles in different periods of China's growth
in transition, this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidised land and …

We posit that autocrats introduce local elections when their bureaucratic capacity is low.
Local elections exploit citizens' informational advantage in keeping local officials …

To explain the capabilityof China's Party-state to generate institutional and policy
innovations for economic reform and to adapt to a rapidly changing economic environment …

Global south countries, including China, have faced a challenging dilemma of reducing
carbon emissions while maintaining rapid economic growth. The low-carbon city pilots …

The central government of China hopes to acquire policy tools and measures of low-carbon
pilot city development through policy innovation. This study sorts out and offers an …

In this study, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of official promotion from
the perspective of managing economic growth targets. Using a manual dataset of economic …

This article examines the political budget cycles in Chinese counties. The shift to a more
performance‐based cadre evaluation and mobility system during the reform era has created …

We argue that interjurisdiction competition in authoritarian regimes engenders a specific
logic for taxation. Promotion-seeking local officials are incentivized to signal loyalty and …

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage
expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow …

This paper provides evidence on the impact of political incentives on the environment using
the case of China's pollution. Exploring variation in governors' connections with key officials …