Timing attacks are among the most devastating side-channel attacks, allowing remote
attackers to retrieve secret material, including cryptographic keys, with relative ease. In …

In the era of microarchitectural side channels, vendors scramble to deploy mitigations for
transient execution attacks, but leave traditional side-channel attacks against sensitive …

Spectre vulnerabilities violate our fundamental assumptions about architectural abstractions,
allowing attackers to steal sensitive data despite previously state-of-the-art …

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must
adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side …

Spectre are microarchitectural attacks which were made public in January 2018. They allow
an attacker to recover secrets by exploiting speculations. Detection of Spectre is particularly …

The SPECTRE family of speculative execution attacks has required a rethinking of formal
methods for security. Approaches based on operational speculative semantics have made …

High-assurance cryptography leverages methods from program verification and
cryptography engineering to deliver efficient cryptographic software with machine-checked …

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in
exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to …

Cryptography secures our online interactions, transactions, and trust. To achieve this goal,
not only do the cryptographic primitives and protocols need to be secure in theory, they also …

We propose ProSpeCT, a generic formal processor model providing provably secure
speculation for the constant-time policy. For constant-time programs under a non …