Inefficient cooperation under stochastic and strategic uncertainty
L Bruttel, W Güth, J Nithammer… - Journal of Conflict …, 2022 - journals.sagepub.com
Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial
cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to …
cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to …
[HTML][HTML] Who cares when Value (Mis) reporting may be found out? An Acquiring-a-Company experiment with value messages and information leaks
We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study how information leaks affect lying and
market outcomes in an ultimatum bargaining setting with asymmetric information. Privately …
market outcomes in an ultimatum bargaining setting with asymmetric information. Privately …
Who cares when value (mis) reporting may be found out?
In an ultimatum bargaining, we investigate lying as falsely stating what one privately knows
without, however, excluding that others find out the truth. Specifically, we modify the …
without, however, excluding that others find out the truth. Specifically, we modify the …
Spilling the Tea, Memoir of a Future's Past: A Scholarly Personal Narrative
DJ Hector - 2023 - search.proquest.com
Abstract Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning (LGBTQ) individuals and
topics have been at the precipice of media coverage and policy decisions for decades. With …
topics have been at the precipice of media coverage and policy decisions for decades. With …
Hiding or revealing: their indirect evolution in the Acquiring-a-Company game
W Güth, S Napel - Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2022 - Springer
Abstract The Acquiring-a-Company game of Bazerman and Samuelson (J Confl Resolut 27
(4): 618–634, 1983) is modified by letting the privately informed seller send a numerical …
(4): 618–634, 1983) is modified by letting the privately informed seller send a numerical …
Transparent Dealing instead of Insider Haggling-Experimentally Analyzing an Institutional Choice for Repeated Trade
DT di Cagno, L Ferrari, W Güth, V Larocca - 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
In repeated commercial and organizational interactions, it is not unusual to observe privately
informed parties enter long-term transparent deals with their counterparts rather than …
informed parties enter long-term transparent deals with their counterparts rather than …