Transaction fee mechanism design

T Roughgarden - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply,
necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include" on-chain" from …

Transaction fee mechanism design in a post-mev world

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024 - eprint.iacr.org
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Mechanism Design for ZK-Rollup Prover Markets

W Wang, L Zhou, A Yaish, F Zhang, B Fisch… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs.
Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over …

Paying to Do Better: Games with Payments between Learning Agents

Y Kolumbus, J Halpern, É Tardos - arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.20880, 2024 - arxiv.org
In repeated games, such as auctions, players typically use learning algorithms to choose
their actions. The use of such autonomous learning agents has become widespread on …

How much should you pay for restaking security?

T Chitra, M Pai - arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.00928, 2024 - arxiv.org
Restaking protocols have aggregated billions of dollars of security by utilizing token
incentives and payments. A natural question to ask is: How much security do restaked …

[PDF][PDF] What Can Cryptography Do For Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

K Wu - 2024 - reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a
new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design …