Strategic interactions between humans and artificial intelligence: Lessons from experiments with computer players

C March - Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021 - Elsevier
Artificial intelligence (AI) is starting to pervade the economic and social life. This renders
strategic interactions between humans and artificial agents more and more common. At the …

Inequity aversion improves cooperation in intertemporal social dilemmas

E Hughes, JZ Leibo, M Phillips… - Advances in neural …, 2018 - proceedings.neurips.cc
Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex,
temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able …

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

W Güth, MG Kocher - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014 - Elsevier
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to
provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game …

Deciding for others reduces loss aversion

O Andersson, HJ Holm, JR Tyran… - Management …, 2016 - pubsonline.informs.org
We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do
not. A large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish …

Differentiable game mechanics

A Letcher, D Balduzzi, S Racaniere, J Martens… - Journal of Machine …, 2019 - jmlr.org
Deep learning is built on the foundational guarantee that gradient descent on an objective
function converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this guarantee fails in settings, such as …

Energy trading in local electricity market with renewables—a contract theoretic approach

U Amin, MJ Hossain, W Tushar… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Emerging smart grid technologies and increased penetration of renewable energy sources
(RESs) direct the power sector to focus on RESs as an alternative to meet both baseload …

Supply chain contracting with asymmetric cost information and behavioral preferences: Theory and experiment

J Chen, Z Jiang, X Zhao, W Zhu, J Xie - Omega, 2024 - Elsevier
We investigate a supply chain composed of a retailer who designs a contract with wholesale
price and order quantity, and a supplier who has private information of low or high unit …

Mechanism design and intentions

F Bierbrauer, N Netzer - Journal of Economic Theory, 2016 - Elsevier
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore
information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight …

Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed− Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution

W Güth, F Marazzi… - Journal of Conflict …, 2024 - journals.sagepub.com
In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can
exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by …

[HTML][HTML] Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory

EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …