Groups of humans are often able to find ways to cooperate with one another in complex, temporally extended social dilemmas. Models based on behavioral economics are only able …
W Güth, MG Kocher - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014 - Elsevier
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game …
We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do not. A large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish …
Deep learning is built on the foundational guarantee that gradient descent on an objective function converges to local minima. Unfortunately, this guarantee fails in settings, such as …
Emerging smart grid technologies and increased penetration of renewable energy sources (RESs) direct the power sector to focus on RESs as an alternative to meet both baseload …
J Chen, Z Jiang, X Zhao, W Zhu, J Xie - Omega, 2024 - Elsevier
We investigate a supply chain composed of a retailer who designs a contract with wholesale price and order quantity, and a supplier who has private information of low or high unit …
We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight …
W Güth, F Marazzi… - Journal of Conflict …, 2024 - journals.sagepub.com
In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by …
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …