Learning and cooperation in sequential games
A Valluri - Adaptive Behavior, 2006 - journals.sagepub.com
The predictions of classical game theory for one-shot and finitely repeated play of many 2x2
simulta neous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
simulta neous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
[PDF][PDF] Learning and Cooperation in Sequential Games
A Valluri - 2006 - Citeseer
The predictions of classical game theory for one-shot and finitely repeated play of many 2x2
simultaneous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
simultaneous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
Learning and cooperation in sequential games
A Valluri - Adaptive Behavior, 2006 - go.gale.com
The predictions of classical game theory for one-shot and finitely repeated play of many 2x2
simultaneous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
simultaneous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
Learning and Cooperation in Sequential Games
A Valluri - Adaptive Behavior, 2006 - dl.acm.org
The predictions of classical game theory for one-shot and finitely repeated play of many 2x2
simulta neous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …
simulta neous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …