[HTML][HTML] Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
E Hoppe, P Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - econpapers.repec.org
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games Econ. Behav., 2018 - kups.ub.uni-koeln.de
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - papers.ssrn.com
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - 2018 - mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
[PDF][PDF] Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - core.ac.uk
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical oneshot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - 2018 - ideas.repec.org
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - ideas.repec.org
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory
E Hoppe, P Schmitz - 2018 - econpapers.repec.org
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory
EI Hoppe, PW Schmitz - Games Econ. Behav., 2018 - kups.ub.uni-koeln.de
In a laboratory experiment with 754 participants, we study the canonical one-shot moral
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …
hazard problem, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments …