BootJacker is a proof-of-concept attack tool which demonstrates that authentication
mechanisms employed by an operating system can be bypassed by obtaining physical …

We propose augmenting secure boot with a mechanism to protect against compromises to
field-upgradeable devices. In particular, secure boot standards should verify the firmware of …

Defending computers from unauthorized physical access, malicious hardware devices, or
other low-level attacks has proven extremely challenging. The risks from these attacks are …

There are several attacks known today which leverage physical access to fully patched
systems to read or patch system memory. One of them is the Cold Boot Attack (1), which …

Memory deduplication shares same-content memory pages and reduces the consumption of
physical memory. It is effective on environments that run many virtual machines with the …

It is a well-known issue that attack primitives which exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities
can abuse the ability of processes to automatically restart upon termination. For example …

Security architectures such as Intel SGX need protection against rollback attacks, where the
adversary violates the integrity of a protected application state by replaying old persistently …

Applications that process sensitive data can be carefully designed and validated to be
difficult to attack, but they are usually run on monolithic, commodity operating systems, which …

The isolation of security critical components from an untrusted OS allows to both protect
applications and to harden the OS itself. Virtualization of the memory subsystem is a key …

This presentation will demonstrate that permanent backdooring of hardware is practical. We
have built a generic proof of concept malware for the intel architecture, Rakshasa, capable …