We introduce intention-based social preferences into mechanism design. We explore
information structures that differ with respect to what is commonly known about the weight …

Recent results in mechanism design show that as long as agents have correlated private
information and are sufficiently risk neutral, it is possible to design mechanisms that leave …

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of
alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any …

We study dominant strategy incentive compatibility in a mechanism design setting with
contingent contracts where the payoff of each agent is observed by the principal and can be …

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms
on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this …

This paper examines the problem of how to design incentive% compatible mechanisms in
environments in which the agentsjprivate information evolves stochastically over time and in …

We study two classic challenges in mechanism design–bilateral trade à la Myerson and
Satterthwaite (1983) and redistributive income taxation à la Mirrlees (1971) and Piketty …

The purpose of governments is to increase welfare by providing public goods. A sensible
objective of a government is to provide a public good if, and only if, the net social benefit of …

This paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role
approximation plays in resolving them. Challenge 1: optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to …

We consider mechanism design problems with Knightian uncertainty which is formalized
using incomplete preferences, as in Bewley (1986). Without completeness, decision making …