In this paper, we present InBlock4, a blockchain-based alternative to RPKI for the provision
of Route Origin validation for BGP. InBlock4 embeds an alternative trust model to protect …

The inter-domain routing with BGP is highly vulnerable to malicious attacks, due to the lack
of a secure means of verifying authenticity and legitimacy of inter-domain routes. Resource …

Route hijacking attacks exploit the mutual trust that BGP architecture is based on, rather than
any vulnerabilities or protocol flaws. For this reason, these attacks are as old as the protocol …

Origin authentication is one of the most concentrated and advocated BGP security approach
against IP prefix hijacking. However, the potential risk of centralized authority abuse and the …

The whole Internet consists of thousands of autonomous systems that transfer data with one
another. The BGP plays a significant role in routing, but its behaviour is essentially naive …

Without the design for inherent security, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is vulnerable to
prefix/subprefix hijacks and other attacks. Though many BGP security approaches have …

Routing on the Internet is defined among autonomous systems (ASes) based on a weak
trust model where it is assumed that ASes are honest. While this trust model strengthens the …

BGP is the de facto inter-domain routing protocol that plays an important role on the Internet.
However, BGP suffers from the origin and path hijacking due to its lack of validation for BGP …

The inter-domain routing with BGP is highly vulnerable to malicious attacks, due to the lack
of a secure means of verifying authenticity and legitimacy of inter-domain routes. Resource …

Communication on the Internet consisting of a massive number of Autonomous Systems
(AS) depends on routing based on Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). Routers generally trust …