Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side- channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret …
Cache partitioning is a principled defense against side-channel attacks on shared last-level caches (LLCs). Such defenses allocate isolated cache regions to distrusting applications …
M Yan, R Sprabery, B Gopireddy… - … IEEE Symposium on …, 2019 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Although clouds have strong virtual memory isolation guarantees, cache attacks stemming from shared caches have proved to be a large security problem. However, despite the past …
Y Guo, A Zigerelli, Y Zhang, J Yang - Proceedings of the 2021 on Great …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
The sharing of last-level cache (LLC) among different CPU cores makes cache vulnerable to side channel attacks. An attacker can get private information about co-running applications …
D Gruss, J Lettner, F Schuster, O Ohrimenko… - 26th USENIX Security …, 2017 - usenix.org
Cache-based side-channel attacks are a serious problem in multi-tenant environments, for example, modern cloud data centers. We address this problem with Cloak, a new technique …
S Briongos, I Bruhns, P Malagón… - 2021 IEEE European …, 2021 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches proved to be an outstanding side channel, as they provide high …
Cache side-channel attacks can be leveraged as a building block in attacks leaking secrets even in the absence of software bugs. Currently, there are no practical and generic …
To stop side channel attacks on CPU caches that have allowed attackers to leak secret information and break basic security mechanisms, the security community has developed a …
For the first time, we practically demonstrate that Intel SGX enclaves are vulnerable against cache-timing attacks. As a case study, we present an access-driven cache-timing attack on …