There is surprising evidence that introspection of our phenomenal states varies greatly
between individuals and within the same individual over time. This puts pressure on the …

Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-
contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual …

Recent work in cognitive and computational neuroscience depicts the brain as in some
(perhaps merely approximate) sense implementing probabilistic inference. This suggests a …

The problem of explaining the relationship between subjective experience and physical
reality remains difficult and unresolved. In most explanations, consciousness is …

Conscious states—state that there is something it is like to be in—seem both rich or full of
detail and ineffable or hard to fully describe or recall. The problem of ineffability, in particular …

In a Bayesian brain, every perceptual decision will take into account internal priors as well
as new incoming evidence. A reality monitoring system—eventually providing the agent us …

Consciousness as used here, refers to the private, subjective experience of being aware of
our perceptions, thoughts, feelings, actions, memories (psychological contents) including the …

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the
scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the …

The neural correlates supporting our perceptual experience of the world remain largely
unknown. Recent studies have shown how stimulus detection and related confidence …

Predictive processing is a recent approach in cognitive science that describes the brain as
an engine of probabilistic hierarchical inference. Initially proposed as a general theory of …