Network cost-sharing without anonymity

T Roughgarden, O Schrijvers - ACM Transactions on Economics and …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
We consider network cost-sharing games with nonanonymous cost functions, where the cost
of each edge is a submodular function of its users, and this cost is shared using the Shapley …

Sharing non-anonymous costs of multiple resources optimally

M Klimm, D Schmand - … : 9th International Conference, CIAC 2015, Paris …, 2015 - Springer
In cost sharing games, the existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria fundamentally
depends on the method that is used to share the resources' costs. We consider a general …

Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations

I Caragiannis, AA Voudouris - Theory of Computing Systems, 2016 - Springer
According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature,
users compete for a divisible resource–such as bandwidth–by submitting bids. The …

Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games

A Epstein, M Feldman, Y Mansour - … of the 8th ACM conference on …, 2007 - dl.acm.org
In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and
sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the edges is either shared equally (fair …

The complexity of equilibria in cost sharing games

V Syrgkanis - Internet and Network Economics: 6th International …, 2010 - Springer
Abstract We study Congestion Games with non-increasing cost functions (Cost Sharing
Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has …

Mechanisms and allocations with positive network externalities

A Bhalgat, S Gollapudi, K Munagala - … of the 13th ACM Conference on …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
With the advent of social networks such as Facebook and LinkedIn, and online offers/deals
web sites, network externalties raise the possibility of marketing and advertising to users …

Cost sharing mechanisms for fair pricing of resource usage

M Mavronicolas, PN Panagopoulou, PG Spirakis - Algorithmica, 2008 - Springer
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive
usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands …

Non-cooperative cost sharing games via subsidies

N Buchbinder, L Lewin-Eytan, J Naor… - Theory of Computing …, 2010 - Springer
We consider a cost sharing system where users are selfish and act according to their own
interest. There is a set of facilities and each facility provides services to a subset of the users …

Design of price mechanisms for network resource allocation via price of anarchy

YJ Chen, J Zhang - Mathematical programming, 2012 - Springer
We study the design of price mechanisms for communication network problems in which a
user's utility depends on the amount of flow she sends through the network, and the …

On existence and properties of approximate pure Nash equilibria in bandwidth allocation games

M Drees, M Feldotto, S Riechers, A Skopalik - International Symposium on …, 2015 - Springer
In bandwidth allocation games (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands
on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided …