The intuitive greater good: Testing the corrective dual process model of moral cognition.

B Bago, W De Neys - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2019 - psycnet.apa.org
Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the
influential dual process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to …

Emotion and deliberative reasoning in moral judgment

DD Cummins, RC Cummins - Frontiers in Psychology, 2012 - frontiersin.org
According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid,
affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision …

Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.

I Patil, MM Zucchelli, W Kool, S Campbell… - Journal of Personality …, 2021 - psycnet.apa.org
Sacrificial moral dilemmas elicit a strong conflict between the motive to not personally harm
someone and the competing motive to achieving the greater good, which is often described …

Time and moral judgment

RS Suter, R Hertwig - Cognition, 2011 - Elsevier
Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-
process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are …

Dual processes and moral conflict: Evidence for deontological reasoners' intuitive utilitarian sensitivity

M Białek, W De Neys - Judgment and Decision making, 2017 - cambridge.org
The prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively
detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in …

Efficient kill–save ratios ease up the cognitive demands on counterintuitive moral utilitarianism

B Trémolière, JF Bonnefon - Personality and Social …, 2014 - journals.sagepub.com
The dual-process model of moral judgment postulates that utilitarian responses to moral
dilemmas (eg, accepting to kill one to save five) are demanding of cognitive resources. Here …

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

B Gürçay, J Baron - Thinking & Reasoning, 2017 - Taylor & Francis
Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model
of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement …

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

JD Greene - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2009 - Elsevier
A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according
to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional …

A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications

M Hauser, F Cushman, L Young… - Mind & …, 2007 - Wiley Online Library
To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly
understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral …

On the wrong track: Process and content in moral psychology

G Kahane - Mind & language, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
According to Joshua Greene's influential dual process model of moral judgment, different
modes of processing are associated with distinct moral outputs: automatic processing with …