Physical cryptographic implementations are vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks, in
which sensitive information can be recovered by analyzing physical phenomena of a device …

With increasing expansion of the Internet of Things, embedded devices equipped with
cryptographic modules become an important factor to protect sensitive data. Even though …

In this study, the authors examine the relationship between and the efficiency of different
approaches to standard (univariate) differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. The authors …

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) exploit weakness in the physical implementation of
cryptographic algorithms, and have emerged as a realistic threat to many critical embedded …

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks received significant attention over the past two decades
due to their effectiveness in breaking mathematically strong cryptographic implementations …

Differential power analysis is a powerful cryptanalytic technique that exploits information
leaking from physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. During the two last …

Abstract The Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) methodology is a qualitative tool
relying on Welch's T-test to assess the security of cryptographic implementations against …

The power consumption and electromagnetic radiation are among the most extensively
used side-channels for analyzing physically observable cryptographic devices. This paper …

Viable cryptosystem designs must address power analysis attacks, and masking is a
commonly proposed technique for defending against these side-channel attacks. It is …

We propose a generic information-theoretic distinguisher for differential side-channel
analysis. Our model of side-channel leakage is a refinement of the one given by Standaert et …