What determines what we see? In contrast to the traditional “modular” understanding of perception, according to which visual processing is encapsulated from higher-level …
KM Sayre - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986 - cambridge.org
This article responds to two unresolved and crucial problems of cognitive science:(1) What is actually accomplished by functions of the nervous system that we ordinarily describe in the …
JK O'regan, A Noë - Behavioral and brain sciences, 2001 - cambridge.org
Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the …
N Block - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1990 - cambridge.org
Abstracts Cognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in …
N Block - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991 - cambridge.org
Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions:(1) Where does consciousness enter into the information …
J Norman - Behavioral and brain sciences, 2002 - cambridge.org
The two contrasting theoretical approaches to visual perception, the constructivist and the ecological, are briefly presented and illustrated through their analyses of space and size …
AJ Marcel - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986 - cambridge.org
When the stored representation of the meaning of a stimulus is accessed through the processing of a sensory input it is maintained in an activated state for a certain amount of …
R Nijhawan - Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2008 - cambridge.org
A necessary consequence of the nature of neural transmission systems is that as change in the physical state of a time-varying event takes place, delays produce error between the …
N Block - Behavioral and brain sciences, 1995 - cambridge.org
Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different “consciousnesses.” Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious …