We use symbolic formal models to study the composition of public key-based protocols with
public key infrastructures (PKIs). We put forth a minimal set of requirements which a PKI …

We study the composition of security protocols when protocols share secrets such as keys.
We show (in a Dolev-Yao model) that if two protocols use disjoint cryptographic primitives …

Extending a compositional protocol logic with an induction rule for secrecy, we prove
soundness for a conventional symbolic protocol execution model, adapt and extend …

Although they do not suffer from clear attacks, various key agreement protocols (for example
that used within the TLS protocol) are deemed as insecure by existing security models for …

Composition theorems in simulation-based approaches allow to build complex protocols
from sub-protocols in a modular way. However, as first pointed out and studied by Canetti …

Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography
and are often basic components in complex and security-sensitive protocols. Thus …

We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound security properties
of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventional …

Authentication and secrecy properties are proved by very different methods: the former by
local reasoning, leading to matching knowledge of all principals about the order of their …

Recently some efforts were made towards capturing the security requirements from digital
signature schemes as an ideal functionality within a composable security framework. This …

We present composition theorems for security protocols, to compose a key exchange
protocol and a symmetric-key protocol that uses the exchanged key. Our results rely on the …