The Squirrel Prover is a proof assistant designed for the computational verification of
cryptographic protocols. It implements a probabilistic logic that captures cryptographic and …

The field of cryptographic protocol verification in the computational model aims at obtaining
formal security proofs of protocols. To facilitate writing such proofs, which are complex and …

There has been intense interest over the last decade in implementations of probabilistic
proofs (IPs, SNARKs, PCPs, and so on): protocols in which an untrusted party proves to a …

First-order logic models of security for cryptographic protocols, based on variants of the
Dolev–Yao model, are now well-established tools. Given that we have checked a given …

Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols.
One of the approaches relies on a computational model that considers issues of complexity …

In this thesis, we show how formal methods can be used for the cryptographically sound
verification of concrete implementations of security protocols in order to obtain trustworthy …

We describe a cryptographically sound formal logic for proving protocol security properties
without explicitly reasoning about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a …

We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against
active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbitrary …

In this paper we investigate the applicability of a bottom-up evaluation strategy for a first-
order fragment of affine linear logic that we introduced in Theory Prac. Log. Program. 4 …

This paper is concerned about relating formal and computational models of cryptography in
case of active adversaries when formal security analysis is done with first order logic As …