Who benefits when firms game corrective policies?

M Reynaert, JM Sallee - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2021 - aeaweb.org
Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that
determines policy. This harms buyers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost …

Corrective policy and Goodhart's law: The case of carbon emissions from automobiles

M Reynaert, JM Sallee - 2016 - nber.org
Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that
determines policy. We show theoretically that such gaming can benefit consumers, even …

Car notches: strategic automaker responses to fuel economy policy

JM Sallee, J Slemrod - 2010 - nber.org
Notches---where small changes in behavior lead to large changes in a tax or subsidy---
figure prominently in many policies, but have been rarely examined by economists. In this …

Using loopholes to reveal the marginal cost of regulation: The case of fuel-economy standards

ST Anderson, JM Sallee - American Economic Review, 2011 - aeaweb.org
Estimating the cost of regulation is difficult. Firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly, however,
when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation. We apply this insight to fuel economy …

The political economy of regulation in markets with naïve consumers

PL Warren, DH Wood - Journal of the European Economic …, 2014 - academic.oup.com
In a model of a competitive industry selling base goods and add-ons, we investigate the
conditions under which citizen-consumers will support policies that eliminate behavioral …

On the welfare costs of naiveté in the US credit-card market

P Heidhues, B Kőszegi - Review of Industrial Organization, 2015 - Springer
In the presence of naive consumers, a participation distortion arises in competitive markets
because the additional profits from naive consumers lead competitive firms to lower …

Automakers' short-run responses to changing gasoline prices

A Langer, NH Miller - Review of Economics and Statistics, 2013 - direct.mit.edu
We provide empirical evidence that automobile manufacturers use cash incentives to offset
how gasoline price fluctuations affect the expected fuel expenses of automobile buyers …

[PDF][PDF] Externalizing the internality

H Allcott, S Mullainathan, D Taubinsky - Unpublished working paper, 2011 - Citeseer
We use a theoretical model and empirically'calibrated simulations of the automobile market
to show how the traditional logic of Pigouvian taxation changes when consumers are …

Profiting from regulation: Evidence from the European carbon market

JB Bushnell, H Chong, ET Mansur - American Economic Journal …, 2013 - aeaweb.org
We investigate how cap-and-trade regulation affects profits. In late April 2006, the EU CO2
allowance price dropped 50 percent, equating to a€ 28 billion reduction in the value of …

Tax incidence with endogenous quality and costly bargaining: Theory and evidence from hybrid vehicle subsidies

S Gulati, C McAusland, JM Sallee - Journal of Public Economics, 2017 - Elsevier
Endogenous quality and bargaining are important features of many markets but are typically
omitted from studies of incidence. We develop a model with product upgrades and costly …