I discuss recent findings from behavioral economic experiments in the lab and in the field on
the role of leaders in human cooperation. Three implications for leadership are derived …

We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader‐follower voluntary
contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual's cooperativeness and the …

A fundamental challenge to understanding our evolved psychology is to explain how
cooperative or prosocial behaviors are maintained despite the immediate temptation to free …

Two major types of motivation underlie the ability of leaders to gain cooperation in groups.
First is the desire of people to gain rewards and avoid punishments. Leaders can tap into …

This paper reports the results of experiments which examine attributions of leadership
quality. Subjects played an abstract coordination game which is like many organizational …

We investigate the effectiveness of two leadership institutions in each of two games: a
weakest link and a linear public good game. An “Exemplar” leader is a first mover who …

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a
repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the …

We return to the analysis of cooperation among interdependent rational individuals. We
emphasize the limited impact of iteration (or repeated play) and explore the possibility of an …

Although recent economics contributions represent important strides forward in the
understanding of leadership behavior, the cognitive and symbolic dimensions of the …

We study how financial incentives can be used to overcome a history of coordination failure
using controlled laboratory experiments. Subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high …