The predictions of classical game theory for one-shot and finitely repeated play of many 2x2
simulta neous games do not correspond to human behavior observed in laboratory …

We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the
experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. We suppose that learning …

We present a connectionist model for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game which we
explored in different game-playing environments. The role of anticipation on cooperation …

We consider the problem of learning in repeated general-sum matrix games when a
learning algorithm can observe the actions but not the payoffs of its associates. Due to the …

Cooperation in repeated games has been widely studied in experimental settings; however,
the duration over which players participate in such experiments is typically confined to at …

In this work, we ask for and answer what makes classical temporal-difference reinforcement
learning with ϵ-greedy strategies cooperative. Cooperating in social dilemma situations is …

Across many domains of interaction, both natural and artificial, individuals use past
experience to shape future behaviors. The results of such learning processes depend on …

Abstract Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, Aumann, 1987) is an important
generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept for multiplayer non-cooperative games. In a …

Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game
repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally …

Evolutionary game-theory is a popular way to investigate models of cooperation. But this has
the obvious disadvantage that evolution with the propagation of genes over generations is …