Cache side-channels are a major threat to cryptographic implementations, particularly block
ciphers. Traditional manual hardening methods transform block ciphers into Boolean …

Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can,
therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very …

We present SEIF, a methodology that combines static analysis with symbolic execution to
verify and explicate information flow paths in a hardware design. SEIF begins with a …

This thesis serves as a brief survey of contemporary approaches for the detection of source
code vulnerable to timing attacks and aims to assess their applicability to the JavaCard …

We propose a trace-based symbolic method for analyzing cache side channels of a program
under a CPU-level optimization called out-of-order execution (OOE). The method is …

We present SEIF, an exploratory methodology for information flow verification based on
symbolic execution. SEIF begins with a statically built overapproximation of the information …

Side-channel vulnerabilities can leak sensitive information unconsciously. In this paper, we
introduce the usage of Abacus. Abacus is a tool that can analyze secret-dependent control …

在云存储服务中, 安全的加密数据去重通常需要依赖可信第三方服务器(trusted third party, TTP).
为了解决这一问题, 提出了一种基于英特尔软件防护扩展(Intel software guard extension, Intel …

Cache side-channel attacks leverage secret-dependent footprints in CPU cache to steal
confidential information, such as encryption keys. Due to the lack of a proper abstraction for …

Hardware is often represented as an abstract layer that behaves correctly, executes
instructions and produces a result. However, side effects due to the execution of …