How market design emerged from game theory: A mutual interview

AE Roth, RB Wilson - Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019 - aeaweb.org
We interview each other about how game theory and mechanism design evolved into
practical market design. When we learned game theory, games were modeled either in …

Stable matching in large economies

YK Che, J Kim, F Kojima - Econometrica, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
We study stability of two‐sided many‐to‐one matching in which firms' preferences for
workers may exhibit complementarities. Although such preferences are known to jeopardize …

Centralized admissions for engineering colleges in India

S Baswana, PP Chakrabarti, S Chandran… - Proceedings of the …, 2019 - dl.acm.org
The centrally funded technical institutes (CFTIs) for undergraduate studies in India consist of
the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) as well as several non-IITs (the National …

Testing the efficacy of replacing the incurred credit loss model with the expected credit loss model

M Gomaa, K Kanagaretnam, S Mestelman… - European Accounting …, 2019 - Taylor & Francis
We use a controlled laboratory environment to provide evidence on the potential efficacy of
the replacement of the Incurred Credit Loss (ICL) Model of International Accounting …

Experiments on matching markets: A survey

R Hakimov, D Kübler - 2019 - econstor.eu
The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house
allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The …

Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets

MP Dargnies, R Hakimov, D Kübler - Management Science, 2019 - pubsonline.informs.org
We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of labor
markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants …

When do stable matching mechanisms fail? The role of standardized tests in college admissions

M Jiang - The Role of Standardized Tests in College Admissions …, 2019 - papers.ssrn.com
In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are
misaligned. In the case of centralized college admissions, students are matched based on …

[PDF][PDF] Strategic experimentation and information design in dynamic contests: An experimental study

Y Chen, M Mostagir, I Yeckehzaare - Not Published Yet, 2019 - www-personal.umich.edu
Many real-world innovation contests and R&D races have an end goal that might be
infeasible. Participants learn about feasibility from their own experimentation and also from …

t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments

E Kazumori, Y Belch - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 2019 - Elsevier
This paper provides a brief introduction to t-Tree, a general auction software package that
implements single-unit auctions, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions (“VCG auctions”) …

Sistemas de etiquetado nutricional frontal: análisis desde la arquitectura de elección y la economía experimental

ME Rul - 2019 - repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar
Como consecuencia de los altos índices de obesidad y otras enfermedades relacionadas
con la malnutrición, es que se han desarrollado múltiples acciones para combatirlas. Dentro …