When blockchain meets auction: A comprehensive survey

X Liu, L Liu, Y Yuan, YH Long, SX Li… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Recent years have witnessed remarkable developments and increasingly deepened
integrations between blockchain as a decentralized computing architecture and auction as …

Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, T Roughgarden, E Shi - arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.09321, 2024 - arxiv.org
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …

Transaction fee mechanism design in a post-mev world

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2024 - eprint.iacr.org
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …

Mechanism Design for ZK-Rollup Prover Markets

W Wang, L Zhou, A Yaish, F Zhang, B Fisch… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
In ZK-Rollups, provers spend significant computational resources to generate validity proofs.
Their costs should be compensated properly, so a sustainable prover market can form over …

Designing Redistribution Mechanisms for Reducing Transaction Fees in Blockchains

S Damle, M Padala, S Gujar - arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.13262, 2024 - arxiv.org
Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user
transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (ie, transaction fees) …

No Transaction Fees? No Problem! Achieving Fairness in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

S Damle, V Srivastava, S Gujar - arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.04634, 2024 - arxiv.org
The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic
interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a …

Barriers to collusion-resistant transaction fee mechanisms

Y Gafni, A Yaish - arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08564, 2024 - arxiv.org
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee
mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is …

Blockchain price vs. quantity controls

A Ndiaye - arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.00235, 2024 - arxiv.org
This paper studies the optimal transaction fee mechanisms for blockchains, focusing on the
distinction between price-based ($\mathcal {P} $) and quantity-based ($\mathcal {Q} $) …

Multidimensional Blockchain Fees are (Essentially) Optimal

G Angeris, T Diamandis, C Moallemi - arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.08661, 2024 - arxiv.org
In this paper we show that, using only mild assumptions, previously proposed
multidimensional blockchain fee markets are essentially optimal, even against worst-case …

Multi-side incentive compatible transaction fee mechanism

X Liu, Y Liu, H Li, JJ Wang, J Zhu, H Song - Computers and Electrical …, 2024 - Elsevier
Propelled by ongoing advances in blockchain technologies, transaction volumes of major
cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum have surged, causing strain on network …