T Roughgarden - ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2021 - dl.acm.org
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include" on-chain" from …
X Liu, L Liu, Y Yuan, YH Long, SX Li… - IEEE Transactions on …, 2024 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Recent years have witnessed remarkable developments and increasingly deepened integrations between blockchain as a decentralized computing architecture and auction as …
How financial technology impacts financial inclusion and democratic access to financial services is central for policy discussions and applied research (World Bank Group, 2016; …
E Shi, H Chung - Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, 2023 - par.nsf.gov
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design …
L Zhang, F Zhang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.02552, 2023 - arxiv.org
Blockchain enables peer-to-peer transactions in cyberspace without a trusted third party. The rapid growth of Ethereum and smart contract blockchains generally calls for well …
Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In early …
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with* passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …
Transactions submitted through the blockchain peer-to-peer (P2P) network may leak out exploitable information. We study the economic incentives behind the adoption of …
K Wu, E Shi, H Chung - arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.12895, 2023 - arxiv.org
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the …