Problems with Wednesbury Unreasonableness in Contract Law: Lessons from Public Law

135 Law Quarterly Review, 2019, Forthcoming

University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2018/010

32 Pages Posted: 18 Jan 2018 Last revised: 6 Mar 2018

See all articles by Ernest Lim

Ernest Lim

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law

Cora Chan

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 10, 2018

Abstract

This article identifies three key problems with the English courts’ current use of Wednesbury unreasonableness to control the exercise of discretion in contract law. First, there are misconceptions about the nature of Wednesbury review in contract law. Second, the intensity with which courts should apply Wednesbury unreasonableness is unclear. Finally, the contents of Wednesbury unreasonableness have been considered vague, leading to uncertainty in its application. This article proposes solutions to each of these problems by examining the jurisprudence and discourse on Wednesbury unreasonableness in public law.

Keywords: Wednesbury Unreasonableness, Braganza, Contract Law, Contractual Discretion, Administrative Discretion, Public Law, Intensity of Review, Deference

Suggested Citation

Lim, Ernest and Chan, Cora, Problems with Wednesbury Unreasonableness in Contract Law: Lessons from Public Law (January 10, 2018). 135 Law Quarterly Review, 2019, Forthcoming, University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 2018/010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3103348 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3103348

Ernest Lim (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) - Faculty of Law ( email )

469G Bukit Timah Road
Eu Tong Sen Building
Singapore, 259776
Singapore

Cora Chan

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

HOME PAGE: http://hub.hku.hk/rp/rp01296

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