We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods to n equally entitled agents. Every agent i
has a valuation function vi from some given class of valuation functions. A share s is a …

We analyze the run-time complexity of computing allocations that are both fair and maximize
the utilitarian social welfare, defined as the sum of agents' utilities. We focus on two tractable …

Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we
explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by …

Serial dictatorship is a simple mechanism for coordinating agents in solving combinatorial
optimization problems according to their preferences. The most representative such problem …

Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we
explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by …

Parmi les critères d'équité pour l'allocation de ressources indivisibles à un groupe d'agents,
certains sont basés sur des niveaux d'utilité minimaux à garantir à tous les agents. Ces …

Fair division is a fundamental problem in multi-agent systems that involves the allocation of
a set of items (goods or chores) among selfinterested agents [28]. The formal study of fair …