Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game
forms Page 1 Vol.:(0123456789) Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09820-3 …

Individual rights can generally be respected if and, except in rare special cases, only if they
apply to independent components of a Cartesian product space of social states, and also …

Power is a core concept for the analysis and design of organisations. The literature contains
a wide variety of contributions from various disciplines dealing with different types and …

A two-player game form is Nash-consistent if and only if it is tight (Gurvich). Therefore Nash-
consistency of two-player game forms depends only on the effectivity structure. This fact is …

We give an alternative proof of a theorem by Gurvich: A game form G is equivalent to a free
extensive game form with perfect information if and only if G is rectangular and tight. It …

We introduce the exact core and the biexact core of a strategic game form. Those are
solutions which lie between the usual β-core and the set of strong equilibrium outcomes. We …

We introduce a new class of game forms called effectively rectangular game forms. An
effectively rectangular game form is one that has the same effectivity function as some …

Peleg established a fundamental theorem which says that convex effectivity functions are
stable. He also proved its partial converse: Within the class of maximal effectivity functions …

A game form is N-solvable for a class of payoff functions. If for every pair of payoff functions
of that class, the associated game in strategic form has a Nash equilibrium. A finite game …