T Harks, M Klimm - Mathematics of Operations Research, 2012 - pubsonline.informs.org
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Let 𝒞 denote a set of cost functions. We say that 𝒞 is consistent if every weighted congestion game with …
Joint use of resources with usage-dependent cost raises the question: who pays how much? We study cost sharing in resource selection games where the strategy spaces are either …
Congestion games are a fundamental and widely studied model for selfish allocation problems like routing and load balancing. An intrinsic property of these games is that players …
We study a class of finite strategic games with the property that every deviation of a coalition of players that is profitable to each of its members strictly decreases the lexicographical …
T Harks, M Klimm - International Colloquium on Automata, Languages …, 2010 - Springer
We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Let C denote a set of cost functions. We say that C is consistent if every weighted congestion game with …
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With …
Bottleneck congestion games properly model the properties of many real-world network routing applications. They are known to possess strong equilibria—a strengthening of Nash …
L Gourvès, J Monnot - … Conference on Theory and Applications of Models …, 2010 - Springer
An instance of the max k− cut game is an edge weighted graph. Every vertex is controlled by an autonomous agent with strategy space [1.. k]. Given a player i, his payoff is defined as the …
We investigate strong Nash equilibria in the max k-cut game, where we are given an undirected edge-weighted graph together with a set {1, ..., k\} of k colors. Nodes represent …