Problems for credulism

J Pryor - Seemings and justification: New essays on dogmatism …, 2013 - books.google.com
I've defended views about the epistemology of perception that I call “dogmatist.” They are
close to views defended by Michael Huemer and John Pollock, and somewhat more broadly …

Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat

M Lasonen-Aarnio - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014 - JSTOR
Recent authors have drawn attention to a kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to
as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one's doxastic state …

Permission to believe: Why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief

M Schoenfield - Noûs, 2014 - Wiley Online Library
In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more
than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we …

Epistemic akrasia

S Horowitz - Noûs, 2014 - JSTOR
Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in
something like," P, but my evidence doesn't support P." Call this idea the" Non-Akrasia …

Rationality's fixed point (or: In defense of right reason)

M Titelbaum - Oxford studies in epistemology, 2015 - books.google.com
Rational requirements have a special status in the theory of rationality. This is obvious in
one sense: they supply the content of that theory. But I want to suggest that rational …

[图书][B] Normative externalism

B Weatherson - 2019 - books.google.com
Normative Externalism argues that it is not important that people live up to their own
principles. What matters, in both ethics and epistemology, is that they live up to the correct …

Evolutionary debunking of moral realism

K Vavova - Philosophy Compass, 2015 - Wiley Online Library
Evolutionary debunking arguments move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary
forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs. My primary aim is to …

VII—Genealogy, epistemology and worldmaking

A Srinivasan - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2019 - academic.oup.com
We suffer from genealogical anxiety when we worry that the contingent origins of our
representations, once revealed, will somehow undermine or cast doubt on those …

You just believe that because...

R White - Philosophical Perspectives, 2010 - JSTOR
I believe that Tom is the proud father of a baby boy. Why do I think his child is a boy? A
natural answer might be that I remember that his name is' Owen'which is usually a boy's …

Irrelevant influences

K Vavova - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a
Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting …