Sok: Decentralized exchanges (dex) with automated market maker (amm) protocols

J Xu, K Paruch, S Cousaert, Y Feng - ACM Computing Surveys, 2023 - dl.acm.org
As an integral part of the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem, decentralized exchanges
(DEXs) with automated market maker (AMM) protocols have gained massive traction with …

Sok: Decentralized finance (defi) attacks

L Zhou, X Xiong, J Ernstberger… - … IEEE Symposium on …, 2023 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Within just four years, the blockchain-based Decentralized Finance (DeFi) ecosystem has
accumulated a peak total value locked (TVL) of more than 253 billion USD. This surge in …

A Study on Blockchain Sandwich Attack Strategies Based on Mechanism Design Game Theory

Y Liang, X Wang, YC Wu, H Fu, M Zhou - Electronics, 2023 - mdpi.com
The rapid progression of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has established Decentralized
Exchanges (DEX) as critical elements in the financial landscape. Nevertheless, the open …

A flash (bot) in the pan: measuring maximal extractable value in private pools

B Weintraub, CF Torres, C Nita-Rotaru… - Proceedings of the 22nd …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
The rise of Ethereum has lead to a flourishing decentralized marketplace that has,
unfortunately, fallen victim to frontrunning and Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) activities …

Sok: Preventing transaction reordering manipulations in decentralized finance

L Heimbach, R Wattenhofer - Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
User transactions on Ethereum's peer-to-peer network are at risk of being attacked. The
smart contracts building decentralized finance (DeFi) have introduced a new transaction …

Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules

MV Xavier Ferreira, DC Parkes - Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for
permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of US ‍dollars. In the …

Sok: Mev countermeasures: Theory and practice

S Yang, F Zhang, K Huang, X Chen, Y Yang… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2022 - arxiv.org
Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of
transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can …

Towards a theory of maximal extractable value i: Constant function market makers

K Kulkarni, T Diamandis, T Chitra - arXiv preprint arXiv:2207.11835, 2022 - arxiv.org
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to excess value captured by miners (or validators)
from users in a cryptocurrency network. This excess value often comes from reordering …

Time to bribe: Measuring block construction market

A Wahrstätter, L Zhou, K Qin, D Svetinovic… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2023 - arxiv.org
With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on
blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from …

Transaction fee mechanism design with active block producers

M Bahrani, P Garimidi, T Roughgarden - International Conference on …, 2024 - Springer
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been
investigated with passive block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards …