In typical theoretical models of voting, all voters submit their vote at once, without an option
to change or revise their decision. While this assumption fits some political voting settings, it …

It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore
ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the …

We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are
defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent …

In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision
among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered …

We propose a model where voters are embedded in a social network. Each voter observes
the ballots of her neighbors in the network, from which she infers the likely outcome of the …

Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic
manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding …

We investigate the effect a social network could have on voting outcomes. We consider a
group of self-interested agents where each agent has a strict preference order over a set of …

Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. In such situations …

We consider best-reply dynamics for voting games in which all players are strategic and no
coalitions are formed. We study the class of scoring rules, show convergence of a suitably …

Voting is widely used to aggregate the different preferences of agents, even though these
agents are often able to manipulate the outcome through strategic voting. Most research on …