We study the design of negotiation strategies when a principal and agent must decide how
to split a pie while the agent's outside option changes over time. The principal's optimal …

We study sequential bargaining between a proposer and a veto player. Both have single‐
peaked preferences, but the proposer is uncertain about the veto player's ideal point. The …

This paper studies a bargaining problem in which the buyer's valuation and outside option
are private information. We show that there exists a non-stationary equilibrium in which the …

Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (eg, court,
arbitration, or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held …

We study a dynamic principal–agent relationship with adverse selection and limited
commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the …

A buyer and seller bargain over a good's price in continuous time, the buyer has a private
value v∈[v, v] and a positive outside option w∈[w, w]. Additionally, bargainers can either be …

I study a dynamic one-sided-offer bargaining model between a seller and a buyer under
incomplete information. The seller knows the quality of his product, while the buyer does not …

Two parties negotiate in the presence of external resolution opportunities (court, arbitration,
or war). The outcome of external resolution depends on the privately held …

This article studies how the presence of concealable hard evidence affects the timing of
agreement and the size and distribution of surplus in bargaining. A buyer and a seller …

This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search
environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited …