We develop a framework to study optimal disability insurance when employers exhibit moral
hazard and show that the optimal system takes into account employerside moral hazard and …

Despite having free access to the public health system, 25% of the Brazilian population have
a private insurance plan, which is subsidized by the government by means of an income tax …

This paper offers the first empirical evidence on the employment consequences and
tradeoffs of tying a firm's Disability Insurance (DI) tax payments to the DI claims of the firm's …

In Finland, large firms are partially liable for the costs of disability and unemployment
benefits paid to their former workers. To estimate the effects of such cost liabilities, we exploit …

While it is well known that supplementary private Disability Insurance (DI) has the potential
to increase workers' moral hazard, the extra coverage may also increase incentives for …

We study whether experience rating for disability insurance (DI) affects the labor costs of
firms and the probability of bankruptcy. The experience rating requires firms to contribute to …

Employer cofinancing in disability insurance (DI) systems aims to reduce the inflow to DI by
making employers internalise their DI costs. We evaluate a cofinancing system for the local …

Purpose The aim of this study was to examine the magnitude of company-level variation in
vocational rehabilitation (VR) and to determine which individual-and company-level …

While it is well known that supplementary private Disability Insurance (DI) has the potential
to increase workers' moral hazard, the extra coverage may also increase incentives for …

Beyond higher wages,“good” firms and “good” jobs may offer different amenities than “bad”
firms and “bad” jobs. Workers may be willing to accept jobs that pay less but offer amenities …