Epidemic Population Games And Perturbed Best Response Dynamics
S Park, J Certorio, NC Martins, RJ La - arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.15475, 2024 - arxiv.org
This paper proposes an approach to mitigate epidemic spread in a population of strategic
agents by encouraging safer behaviors through carefully designed rewards. These rewards …
agents by encouraging safer behaviors through carefully designed rewards. These rewards …
Incentive Designs for Learning Agents to Stabilize Coupled Exogenous Systems
J Certório, NC Martins, RJ La, M Arcak - arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.18164, 2024 - arxiv.org
We consider a large population of learning agents noncooperatively selecting strategies
from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to …
from a common set, influencing the dynamics of an exogenous system (ES) we seek to …
Two competing populations with a common environmental resource
K Paarporn, J Nelson - arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.01437, 2024 - arxiv.org
Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff
functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social …
functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social …