We analyse the design of decision rules by a principal who faces an informed but biased
agent and who is unable to commit to contingent transfers. The contracting problem reduces …

We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into a standard model of
asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We characterize the unique equilibrium …

We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism‐selection games
in which the designer can only commit to short‐term mechanisms. We identify a canonical …

A principal faces an agent who is better informed but biased toward higher actions. She can
verify the agent's information and specify his permissible actions. We show that if the …

Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we
study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes …

We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by
extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality …

We consider a general social choice environment that has multiple agents, a finite set of
alternatives, independent types, and atomless type distribution. We show that for any …

We provide two examples in a pure moral hazard setting with two principals and two agents.
Example 1 shows that a strongly robust equilibrium in simple (direct) mechanisms can no …

An object is allocated among a number of agents. The optimal allocation depends on the
agents' information about their peers, but each agent wants the object for themself. Monetary …

We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his
generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive …