This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to
theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to …

Publisher Summary The study of stable coalition structures, or more generally of coalition
formation, was conducted mainly within the framework of games in coalitional form. The …

During the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, the Kennedy admin? istration demanded
that the Soviet Union remove its missile bases from Cuba. The Soviets acquiesced, but only …

This paper analyzes a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the
coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition …

We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to
the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of …

In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of
political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this …

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in non-democratic societies where institutions do
not enable political commitments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power …

We extend the Ståhl/Rubinstein's alternating-offer model ton-person coalitional bargaining.
The key feature of the model is the random selection of proposers at every round. No delay …

Organizations often distribute resources through weighted voting. We analyze this setting
using a noncooperative bargaining game based on the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model …

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility.
The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as …