We study regulatory mechanism design with collusion between a privately informed agent
and a less well-informed supervisor, incorporating 'extortion'which permits redistribution of …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal
organizational structures in principal–supervisor–agent relationships. I consider a model in …

Voting serves as a fundamental pillar of governance, supporting collective decision-making.
Different from traditional one-person-one-vote systems, blockchain technology-enabled …

We study games in which several principals contract with several privately-informed agents.
We show that enabling the principals to engage in contractible private disclosures–by …

We develop a new approach to contract renegotiation under informational frictions.
Specically, we consider mediated mechanisms which cannot be contingent on any …

Ortner and Chassang (2018) show how a principal can make corruption harder by
randomising the monitor's incentives. We develop their idea by randomising the agent's …

The first part of my thesis studies a problem in which a polluting firm can bribe an inspector
to conceal evidence of illegal pollution. The government can deter bribes by rewarding the …

This paper studies information design in an inspection game. A principal first privately
decides whether to acquire a costly monitoring capability that is needed to detect shirking by …

Ortner and Chassang (2018) show how a principal can make corruption harder by
randomising the monitor's incentives. We develop their idea by randomising the agent's …