We study self-selection in centralized school choice, a strategy that takes place when
students submit preferences before knowing their priorities at schools. A student self-selects …

Many centralized college admissions markets allocate seats to students based on their
performance on a single standardized exam. The exam's measurement error can cause the …

We investigate the relative merits of the Boston and Serial Dictatorship mechanisms when
the timing of students' preference submission over schools varies within the structure of the …

This paper provides empirical evidence on how China's transition from the Boston
mechanism to the Chinese parallel mechanism (a simplified version of the Deferred …

College admissions in many countries are based on a centrally administered test. Applicants
invest a great deal of resources to improve their performance on the test, and there is …

Matching mechanisms play a crucial role in the college admissions process, which in turn
influence education and labor market outcomes. We exploit geographical and temporal …

Many countries base college admissions on a centrally-administered test. Students take the
test and are assigned to colleges based on the rank order of their performance. Students …

China's chemical industry has faced severe environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
issues, such as high safety and environmental accidents and risks. To address these issues …

Strategyproof mechanisms have become the predominant choice for educational
institutions. However, both laboratory experiments and empirical evidence highlight the …

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching
applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic …