We show that higher institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Our identification relies on a discontinuity in ownership around Russell index thresholds. Our …
S Basak, A Pavlova - American Economic Review, 2013 - aeaweb.org
We consider an economy populated by institutional investors alongside standard retail investors. Institutions care about their performance relative to a certain index. Our framework …
Benchmarking incentivizes fund managers to invest a fraction of their funds' assets in their benchmark indexes, and such demand is inelastic. We construct a measure of inelastic …
We explore how mutual fund managers and investors react when the tradeoff between a fund's sustainability and performance becomes salient. Following the introduction of …
LW Cong, K Tang, J Wang, Y Zhang - Available at SSRN 3554486, 2021 - papers.ssrn.com
We directly optimize the objectives of portfolio management via deep reinforcement learning- --an alternative to conventional supervised-learning paradigms that routinely entail first-step …
Active equity funds care about fund size, affected by fund flows that obey a strong factor structure with the common component responding to macroeconomic shocks. Funds hedge …
Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of …
While research has uncovered an array of visible competitive dynamics, a strategic world of competition lies beneath the surface that should also be theorized and empirically traced …
We develop three novel measures of the incentives of equity mutual funds to internalize the price impact of their trading. We show that mutual funds with stronger incentives to …