We consider the problem of computing matchings under two-sided preferences in the
presence of lower as well as upper-quota requirements for the resources. In the presence of …

We consider the hospital-residents problem where both hospitals and residents can have
lower quotas. The input is a bipartite graph G=(ℛ∪ ℋ, E), each vertex in ℛ∪ ℋ has a strict …

We consider a matching problem in a marriage instance G. Every node has a strict
preference order ranking its neighbors. There is a set C of prioritized or critical nodes and …

We consider the stable marriage problem in the presence of ties in preferences and critical
vertices. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph where and denote sets of vertices …

The concept of stable matching is substantially used in bipartite graphs with individual
preferences of the vertices. The existence of stability restricts the weight and size of the …

In this paper, we consider the Hospital Residents problem (HR) and the Hospital Residents
problem with Lower Quotas (HRLQ). In this model with two sided preferences, stability is a …

We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided
preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph …

In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of
applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the …

We consider a matching problem in a hospitals/residents instance G, ie, a many-to-one
matching instance, where every vertex has a strict ranking of its neighbors and hospitals …

We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $ G $ where every vertex has a
capacity and a strict preference order on its neighbors. Furthermore, there is a cost function …