We present an approach to analyze learning outcomes in a broad class of misspecified
environments, spanning both single-agent and social learning. Our main results provide …

A patient player privately observes a persistent state and interacts with an infinite sequence
of myopic uninformed players. The patient player is either a strategic type who maximizes …

A patient seller interacts with a sequence of myopic consumers. Each period, the seller
chooses the quality of his product, and a consumer decides whether to trust the seller after …

This dissertation consists of three chapters on topics in microeconomic theory. In Chapter 1, I
study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a …

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his opponents'
payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in …

Diversity related reputation is becoming increasingly important for managers in
organisations. We study a principal manager career concern relationship where manager …

I study reputation effects under uncertain monitoring. I examine a repeated game between a
long-run player and a series of short-run opponents. The long-run player can either be a …

We analyze situations where players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing
particular actions. A patient player faces a sequence of short-run opponents. Before players …

This thesis consists of three essays on dynamic games with incomplete information. In
Chapter 1, I study reputation effects when individuals have persistent private information that …

In the first chapter, a recommendation platform sequentially collects information on a new
product revealed from past consumer trials and uses it to better guide later consumers …