FM Martin - Review of economic Dynamics, 2009 - Elsevier
A government that cannot commit to future policy choices faces a trade-off that explains the level of debt. On the one hand, there is an incentive to increase debt and delay taxation, so …
T Nakata - Journal of Economic Dynamics and control, 2016 - Elsevier
This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy when the nominal interest rate is subject to the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint in a stochastic New Keynesian economy. In …
Due to time-inconsistency or political turnover, policymakers' promises are not always fulfilled. We analyze an optimal fiscal policy problem where the plans made by the …
The Informal Economy: Measures, Causes, and Consequences provides a comprehensive account of the economics of informality through the lenses of various economic …
FM Martin - European Economic Review, 2015 - Elsevier
Increasing the independence of a central bank from political influence, although ex-ante socially beneficial and initially successful in reducing inflation, would ultimately fail to lower …
M Azzimonti - International Economic Review, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (ie, the Lucas Paradox). Using …
FM Martin - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2011 - Elsevier
The conduct of fiscal and monetary policy absent commitment depends on the interaction between the objective of smoothing distortions intertemporally and a time-consistency …
S Laczó, R Rossi - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2020 - Elsevier
We characterise optimal tax policies when the government has access to consumption taxation and cannot credibly commit to future policies. We consider a neoclassical economy …
FM Martin - International Economic Review, 2013 - Wiley Online Library
I study how the general and specific details of a micro‐founded monetary framework affect the determination of policy when the government has limited commitment. In the general …