This paper describes the influence of government ideology on economic policy-making in
the United States. I review studies using data for the national, state and local levels and …

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it
acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people …

We study the effect of constraints on chiefs' power on economic outcomes, citizens' attitudes,
and social capital. A paramount chief in Sierra Leone must come from a ruling family …

Political machines (or clientelist parties) mobilize electoral support by trading particularistic
benefits to voters in exchange for their votes. But if the secret ballot hides voters' actions from …

Political favoritism affects the allocation of government resources, but is it consequential for
growth? Using a close election regression discontinuity design and data from India, we …

In many young democracies, local politics remain a bastion of nondemocratic practices, from
corruption to clientelism to abuse of power. In a context where these practices are …

Scholars of distributive politics often emphasize partisanship and clientelism. However, as
Jennifer Bussell demonstrates in Clients and Constituents, legislators in" patronage …

How do political parties allocate targetable goods–such as private goods targeted to
individuals, local public goods targeted to geographic areas, or tax breaks targeted to …

We show that political geography has a pervasive effect on the cross-section of stock
returns. We collect election results over a 40-year period and use a political alignment index …

This article analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure
expenditures by the Italian government to the country's 92 provinces between 1953 and …