In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender has to design a signaling scheme that
discloses the right amount of information so as to influence the behavior of a self-interested …

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …

This paper studies information design in social networks. We consider a setting, where
agents' actions exhibit positive local network externalities. There is uncertainty about the …

Mean‐preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information
design. We introduce the class of bi‐pooling policies, and the class of bi‐pooling …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent …

We revisit the celebrated Bayesian persuasion setting and examine how well the Sender
can perform when ignorant of the Receiver's utility. Taking an adversarial approach, we …

Consider a set of agents (receivers) whose payoffs depend on an underlying state of the
world as well as each other's actions. Suppose that a designer (sender) commits to a …

An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of
uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any …

Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information
revelation---often described as a signaling scheme---in order to yield the most desirable …

We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive
sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown …