In this paper, for each solution for TU games, we define its “dual” and “anti-dual”. Then, we
apply these notions to axioms: two axioms are (anti-) dual to each other if whenever a …

In this paper we derive characterizations of egalitarian solutions on two subclasses of the
class of balanced games. Firstly we show that the Dutta–Ray solution is the only solution …

In this paper, the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced. The
classical Dutta–Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex …

Abstract The Equal Division Core (EDC) of a transferable utility cooperative game (TU
game) is the set of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which are not blocked by …

A core concept is a solution concept on the class of balanced games that exclusively selects
core allocations. We show that every continuous core concept that satisfies both the equal …

In this paper, we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for
transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility …

Perhaps the strongest notion of truth-revealing in a cost sharing method is group
strategyproofness. However, matters are not so clear-cut on fairness, and many different …

The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [Dutta, B., Ray, D.,
1989. A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints, Econometrica 57, 615 …

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable
utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure …

A class of balanced games, called exact partition games, is introduced. Within this class, it is
shown that the egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) behaves as in the class of …